O artigo de Jonathan Steinber (na revista Foreign Affairs, setembro de 2011) é muito elucidativo a respeito das revoluções de 1848, mas é exageradamente e eurocêntrico sobre a Primavera Árabe. Pode-se também dizer, para EUA e Europa, o mesmo que ele diz para os árabes: neste momento, não há final feliz no horizonte. Mas e daí? Antes de fazer previsões sobre como isso tudo vai acabar, seria melhor entender o que está de fato acontecendo | Jonathan Steinberg's article (Foreign Affairs, september 2011) is very clear and informative about 1848's revolutions, but it's too pessimistic and eurocentric about the Arab Spring. We could also say: for USA and Europe, there is no happy endind on the horizon too. So what? Before forecasting the end, we have to better understand what's going on |
1848 and 2011
Published on Foreign Affairs
Bringing Down the Old Order is Easy; Building A New One is Tough
Jonathan Steinberg
September 28, 2011
JONATHAN STEINBERG is Walter H. Annenberg Professor of Modern European History at the University of Pennsylvania and the author, most recently, of Bismarck: A Life [1].
September 28, 2011
JONATHAN STEINBERG is Walter H. Annenberg Professor of Modern European History at the University of Pennsylvania and the author, most recently, of Bismarck: A Life [1].
The
similarities between the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt last spring
and the ones in Europe in 1848 are striking. In the early months of
1848, the sclerotic and reactionary political systems that the European
monarchs had developed after Napoleon Bonaparte's 1815 defeat collapsed.
Prince Klemens Wenzel Metternich, who was the state chancellor of the
Austrian empire and a symbol of the despised old order, slipped out of
Vienna on March 15 as an angry mob marched in. Along with Metternich,
the Austrian empire's 23-year-old repressive dictatorship vanished. In
Italy, France, and the German states, the old order crumbled as well.
The scene was not unlike that of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben
Ali's own flight from Tunis 163 years later and the wave of revolutions
across the Middle East that followed. In both cases, the crowds in the
streets were glad to see the dictators go but unclear on the social and
political orders that should replace them.
The revolutionaries of 1848 had a model on which to base their fight:
the French Revolution. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen, which the French National Assembly approved in 1789, had laid
the groundwork for upheavals to come. It declared: "Men are born and
remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions may be founded only
upon the general good." This doctrine was social dynamite. "The gradual
development of the principle of equality is, therefore, a providential
fact," the political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville wrote later, "and
all events as well as all men contribute to its progress."
Napoleon spread the ideas of the enlightenment and revolution to the
European continent at large, usually at bayonet point. Between 1800 and
1815, he consolidated control over an expanding empire by replacing
traditional, often unwritten, legal codes with rational, written ones
and replacing old administrative districts with new. "Careers open to
the talented" -- Napoleon's answer to that great French demand for
equality of opportunity -- turned provincial lawyers into statesmen and
drummer boys into marshals of the empire.
After Napoleon's defeat, the violent political and social upheavals
of his era were not forgotten. When the revolutions of 1848 broke out
three decades later, many expected them to follow the same template --
universal suffrage, followed by revolutionary upheavals, followed by
Jacobin terror. There was some basis for this belief: In the midst of
the upheavals, the "springtime of nations," as it came to be called,
another Bonaparte, Napoleon's nephew Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, returned
from exile. On the strength of his name, he was elected president of the
French Republic in 1848 by an overwhelming margin. He won 5,434,226
votes. The second-most popular candidate, General Louis-Eugène
Cavaignac, the man who crushed the workers' rising of June 1848, won
1,448,107.
Yet Otto von Bismarck, then a representative in the newly created
Prussian legislature, did not expect the terror and Napoleonic expansion
to come again. In a letter to his brother in March 1848, he wrote, "As
long as the present government in Paris can hold on, I do not believe
there will be war, doubt that there's any urge to it," continuing that
"the motives of 1792, the guillotine, and the republican fanaticism . . .
are not present." From his remote outpost in Prussia, Bismarck saw that
the forces of change were no longer those of the original uprisings in
1789. The leaders of Paris in 1848 were imitating what they had read in
books. In Tocqueville's memorable phrase, "The whole thing seemed to me
to be a bad tragedy played by actors from the provinces."
Even as the conservatives at the court of the irresolute King
Frederick Wilhelm IV of Prussia gathered their forces to stop the
uprising and prevent universal suffrage, Bismarck saw that the vote
could be the king's greatest resource. In voting for Louis Napoleon, he
believed, the people of France had selected the one candidate who stood
for order. A decade later, he astounded his benefactor, General Leopold
von Gerlach, by his bold acceptance of democracy. In 1848, he noted,
"Louis Napoleon did not create the revolutionary conditions . . . he did
not rebel against an established order, but instead fished it out of
the whirlpool of anarchy as nobody's property. If he were now to lay it
down, he would greatly embarrass Europe, which would more or less
unanimously beg him to take it up again."
What Bismarck had in mind, however, was not true democracy but
something capable of appeasing the crowds, some of democracy's
institutional forms safely tempered by a monarchical constitution and an
army loyal to the king. In 1848, the European emperors and kings,
nervous as they were, could count on the loyalty of their soldiers. The
generals and the officer corps all belonged to the high aristocracy or
the gentry and owed their status to the monarchy. The armed forces and
the crowned commanders in chief were thus mutually dependent. As the
Prussian general Ludwig Yorck von Wartenburg said to Prince Wilhelm, "If
your Royal Highness deprives me and my children of my rights, what is
the basis of yours?"
Meanwhile, most of the foot soldiers were peasants. Like the
aristocracy, they had little love for the loud and enthusiastic middle
classes whose revolution they had to quell. When they tried to bring
order to narrow streets in town centers, the contents of chamber pots
and boiling water rained down on them. Most European cities had no
proper local police, and the armies of the old regimes had no experience
fighting in the streets. For want of an alternative, the generals
withdrew the troops from city centers to figure out what to do next.
Across Europe, revolutionaries filled the resulting power vacuum with
speeches and draft constitutions. But reactionary forces had already
started to gather. The upheavals had not reached as far as the Russian
empire, and Czar Nicholas I moved his huge army westward. The Austrian
emperor, backed by Nicholas and the Croatian general Count Josip
Jelačić, began to crack down on the Hungarian revolution. Meanwhile,
Austrian General Joseph Radetzky moved in to defeat the Italian
revolutionaries, and the French general Louis-Eugène Cavaignac mobilized
the Parisian middle classes to crush the social movement in the
Parisian slums.
In Berlin, the handsome and charismatic field marshal Friedrich Graf
von Wrangel had a different strategy. On October 9, 1848, the army
paraded from Charlottenburg into the heart of Berlin and drew a huge,
cheering crowd. The event showed that the revolutionaries had lost
support and that the army had regained its prestige. The "springtime of
nations" had ended, but the changes it brought were no less important --
even if they were not what the revolutionaries had sought. Back in
control, the conservatives founded newspapers, strengthened local police
forces, and reconciled themselves to elections and parliaments. They
used their social connections to influence the monarchs. In Prussia, a
group of deeply conservative, evangelical Christian noblemen formed the Camarilla, a secret cabinet, to make sure that the king resisted the liberals.
These anti-revolutionary forces also borrowed heavily from the
revolutionary playbook. Aided by new technologies and railroads, they
strengthened administration and modernized the bureaucracy. Pope Pius IX
whipped up the fervor of the masses through the cult of the Blessed
Virgin Mary, pilgrimages, and popular festivals to show where the
public's loyalty truly rested. The 1840s had been years of poverty and
unrest, but 1850¬-73 saw the first modern economic boom, and a long wave
of prosperity followed. Bismarck, a country squire and political
genius, used Germany's new semi-democratic political structure to rise
to power. By his close contact with General Leopold von Gerlach, the
king's adjutant, he passed his ideas directly through the Camarilla to the king.
The lesson from the "springtime of nations" is that it is easier to
overthrow the old regime than build a new one. Today, the crowds on the
Arab street have no Bismarck to guide them to even limited democracy.
New arrivals squabble with the ministers and generals of the old regime,
the Islamic religious parties with the secularists, the urban activists
with conservatives from villages and tribes. The revolutionaries call
for "democracy" and "freedom," but nobody knows exactly what those terms
might mean for societies imperfectly modernized and without the
European experiences of rights, constitutions, and equality. Happy
endings seem implausible.
Published on Foreign Affairs
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